This paper analyzes the reaction of the stock market to the monetary policy actions of the Federal Reserve (the Fed). Specifically, we examine the reaction of the stock market to the monetary policy announcements by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Fed. We show that the full information conveyed by the Fed is not immediately incorporated in asset prices and that there is a statistically significant abnormal return to a broad market index on the day after the announcement by the FOMC of its monetary policy actions. We use data from the federal funds futures market to measure the expected and unexpected changes in the federal funds rate. We demonstrate that the market reacts to the unexpected changes in monetary policy of the FOMC. We detect positive and statistically significant abnormal market returns on the day after the FOMC makes its monetary policy announcements. We reject the hypothesis that these returns are unpredictable by finding predictable returns the day following the day of the FOMC announcement of its monetary policy actions.
Introduction
For a long time, academic researchers, securities market participants, and policy makers have been interested in how financial asset prices adjust to new information, including information related to the policy announcements of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve (Fed) . In spite of the fact that various researchers have established a long list of anomalies, 3 which suggest some predictability in financial markets, most scholars and textbook authors in finance and economics are inclined to believe that financial asset prices are either very difficult or impossible to predict. Their faith in efficient markets (the Efficient Market Hypothesis or EMH) 4 remains strong despite this growing body of literature regarding irrational behavior by investors, anomalies in the markets, and predictability of returns-all of which would seem to merit a rejection of the EMH.
3 DeBondt and Thaler (1985) detect over-reaction in markets, while Michaely et. al. (1995) and Bernard and Thomas (1989) detect market under-reactions. Many other anomalies, such as size effect and momentum effect, are now established in the literature. See Jegadeesh and Titman, (1993) and (2001), as well as Schwert (2001) for a more extensive description of these anomalies and their persistence. Additional studies that demonstrate market mis-reaction include (but are not limited to) the following: Mendenhall (1991) and Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) study market reaction to earnings announcements; Grinblatt, Masulis, and Sheridan (1984) and Desai and Prem (1997) study stock splits; Ikemberry and Stice (1996) evaluate tender offers; Akhigbe, Gosnell and Harikumar (1998) , Atkins and Dyl (1990) , Bremer and Sweeney (1991) , Brown, Harlow, and Tinic (1988) , Cox and Peterson (1994) , Howe (1986) , and Peterson (1995) examine post-event abnormal returns related to extreme, 1-day stock price changes for U. S. stocks; Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) , Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Varmaelen (1995) study market repurchases; Groth, Lewellen, Scharbaum, and Lease (1979) , Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1983) , Elton, Gruber, and Gultekin (1984) , and Womack (1996) study seasonal equity offerings; Lougran and Ritter (1995) , Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) study revisions in analysts' recommendations; Seyhun (1986) and (1988) studies public announcements of insider trades; Gomper and Lerner (2005) study venture capital share distributions; Chan (2003) studies headline news. Perhaps the most helpful work is that of Schwert (2001) , who has published a detailed list of market anomalies detected over the past few decades. He reviews the persistence of these anomalies and shows that most of the anomalies have disappeared over time. After they are detected and disclosed to market participants, market participants take actions that apparently eliminate the anomalies and end their ability to earn abnormal returns. This result is often termed "long-term efficiency of the markets."
The common understanding of market efficiency defines financial markets as efficient when prices react speedily and properly to newly available information (Fama 1970 and 1991) . Eugene Fama's summary generally categorizes market efficiency hypotheses as weak form (efficient with regard to all past information), semi-strong form (efficient with regard to all currently available information as well as past information), and strong form (efficient with regard to insider information as well, the one hypothesis rejected even by the faithful). Thus, the general idea behind the EMH is that asset prices are determined by the underlying supply and demand for securities offered in a competitive market populated with rational investors who gather all relevant information very rapidly and act immediately upon the information by buying or selling the appropriate financial asset, which results in the right, though unpredictable price. If, in this efficient markets world, information is immediately incorporated into prices, then only new information (news)
should cause changes in prices. Since news is unpredictable, price changes should also be unpredictable. This analysis led t the prevailing belief, especially among academics, that stock prices follow a so-called "random walk," and the best prediction of next year's stock price is today's price plus an unpredictable drift term.
In truth, substantial evidence exists to challenge the traditional (semi-strong) EMH that assets are priced to reflect all publicly available information. when the event-date abnormal returns have the opposite sign of the returns over the subsequent period. On the event-date, the market over-reacts to news and, only later, corrects the over-adjustment.
As indicated, in order to understand the process of price adjustment to newly available information, a rational expectations framework has been employed (Brown and Jennings, 1989, and Grundy and McNichols, 1989) . However, actions of market participants that affect prices are dependent on additional factors that explain human behavior, including biased behaviors. Thus, behavioral models have been used to explain anomalies. Human psychology suggests that participants may be prone to actions that can affect stock prices, but that are not particularly rational (Barberis et. al., 1998; Daniel et. al., 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999; and Hirshleifer, 2001) .
A brief review of other relevant studies
We will examine in a little greater detail a few studies that are particularly relevant to the study at hand because they examine over-and under-reaction related to securities markets or market indices. First, Ajayi and Mehdian (1994) studies investor over-reaction to 5 Ibid. See footnote 3 herein.
unexpected news or events that affected major international stock markets. In fact, their objective was to test the hypothesis that the market indices for eight international stock markets over-reacted to newly disclosed and unexpected events (news). The results of their study were mixed in that they found support for over-reaction in some of these markets, under-reaction in others, and market efficiency in still others.
Ball and Brown (1968) See also Bernard and Thomas (1989); Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996); and Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman (2003) . 7 Bernard and Thomas (1989) suggest that the "delayed response" hypothesis is a more likely explanation for the drift. Hong and Stein (1999) propose that the market under-reacts because private information diffuses gradually across investors. They suggest that, although the news itself is pubic, some other, private information may be needed in order to convert this news into a judgment related to value. They call this explanation a "gradual information diffusion" explanation. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) The first published research that reported on the markets' reaction to monetary policy announcements is Cook and Hahn (1989) , who studied the one-day response of bond rates to changes in the fed funds target rate (FFTR). Their study covered a period prior to 1994, when the FOMC began to announce of any changes in the target rate on the same day of the meetings. Their research procedure involved performing a regression of the change in Treasury Bill (T-Bill), Treasury Note (T-Note), and Treasury Bond (T-bond)
rates on the change in the FFTR for a sample taken from the years 1974 through 1979 that consisted of the 75 days on which the Fed changed the FFTR. Thus, the actual changes in the FFTR were used to assess the impact of monetary policy announcements on bond rates.
Since this first study by Cook and Hahn, other studies have examined monetary policy surprises and interest rates. Kuttner (2001) examined the impact of monetary policy actions on T-Bill, T-Note, and T-Bond yield using data from the futures market for fed funds. He also separated changes in the target fed funds rate into anticipated and unanticipated components. He found the bond rates' response to anticipated changes to be essentially zero, but he found their response to unanticipated (surprise) changes in target rates to be large and highly significant. Rigobon and Sack (2002) used an identification technique based on the heteroskedasticity of stock market returns to measure the reaction of monetary policy to the stock market.
In their study, they used the 3-month Eurodollar rate as an indicator of monetary policy.
propose a model of investor sentiment to explain market under-and over-reaction. Their model is based on literature related to the psychology of decision-making. In particular, they suggest that market underreaction is consistent with a phenomenon documented in psychology. What psychology refers to as "conservatism" in decision-making is defined as the slow updating of models in the presence of new information.
They found a significant policy response, with a 5 percent rise (fall) in the S&P 500
Index. Their study utilized various stock market indices (DJIA, S&P500, NASDAQ, and WILSHIRE 5000) and demonstrated that increases in the Eurodollar rates have a negative impact on asset prices and a positive impact on interest rates, with the largest impact on shorter-term rates. Their paper did not break down the changes in the FFTR to study the impact of the expected and unexpected changes in the FFTR on interest rates.
More recently, Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) of The Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis completed a similar investigation of the extent to which market participants (in the Treasury Bill, Note, and Bond markets) anticipate Fed policy actions. They also found that the 3-month rate responded to expected changes efficiently. Interestingly, they found that the Treasuries' market only responds to expected target changes when new information is simultaneously provided. The new information they note is the added information that the discount rate will also change. Significantly, their study also seems to suggest that market transparency following the 1994 FOMC policy of announcing changes in the target fed funds rate only in the FOMC meeting has meant that the market correctly anticipated even surprise events in seven of ten such situations post-1993. If they are correct, then FOMC transparency should facilitate an efficient market for stocks as well. They suggest that greater clarity enables the market to better predict how the Fed is likely to respond to incoming information about the economy.
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) measured and analyzed (in some detail) the stock market's response to monetary policy actions, both in the aggregate and at the level of industry portfolios. They also attempted to explain the reasons behind the stock market's response to changes in monetary policy. However, estimating the response of equity prices to monetary policy actions is not straightforward, as the market is unlikely to respond to policy actions that were already anticipated. Thus, researchers need a mechanism by which they can distinguish between expected and unexpected monetary policy actions.
Bernanke and Kuttner use the technique proposed by Kuttner (2001) , in which FFTR data is used to construct a measure of surprise rate changes that serve as a proxy for monetary policy actions. Using this methodology, they find that unanticipated rate changes are negatively related to changes in equity prices. Specifically, they suggest that a hypothetical, surprise rate cut of 25 basis points would typically lead to an increase in stock prices on the order of 100 basis points. In general, they believe that monetary policy actions affect stock prices through its impact on real interest rates, expected future dividends, or expected future stock returns. Of additional relevance to our study, they
show that changes in equity prices as a response to changes in monetary policy are associated with expected future excess returns on the market.
Finally, Bomfim (2003) examined the effects of pre-announcement of monetary policy on the stock market. Results of his study suggest that the stock market is relatively quiet on days preceding the FOMC announcement of its monetary policy (FFTR). He also studied how the actual FOMC interest rate decisions affected stock market volatility. He reports in his paper that surprise elements related to monetary policy announcements increased stock market volatility in the short run and that positive surprises (defined as higher than expected target fed funds rates) tended to have a greater effect on volatility.
Bomfim (2003) concludes his paper with suggestions for further study, including analyzing the market's response to scheduled and unscheduled announcements. Another issue he suggested was whether "the corresponding impulse response functions for volatility are significantly different" (Bomfim, 2003; Li and Engle, 1998) . Importantly, he suggests that the issue of the impact of pre-announcement on the stock market is ripe for study by the market microstructure researcher.
The Futures on the FFTR
As indicated above, in order to measure the impact of monetary policy on asset prices, several approached have been adopted by researchers. Kuttner (2001) The CBOT offers contracts ranging from the current month to 24 months out. The settlement price in these contracts is equal to 100 minus the average of the effective federal funds rate for the month of the contract.
Since their inception in 1988, prices of fed funds futures contracts have been popular as a simple way of measuring market expectations about the monetary policy and for forecasting the FOMC's future policy moves. As indicated, these contracts are based on the monthly average of the effective fed funds rate, but it is the target fed funds rate or TFFR that is the main policy instrument of the Fed. However, the effective fed funds rate on average follows the target set by the Fed, so the rate implied from prices can be interpreted as the expected average of the FFTR for the remaining days of the month.
Kuttner (2001) 
Assuming that premium ε is not significant 9 to have an impact on the policy, we get an expression for finding the unexpected portion of the monetary policy action. 
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The data and our analysis
In Table 1 we report the FFTR levels, the expected and unexpected changes in the rate for all the days for which we study the stock market's reaction. This covers 156 eventdays from June, 1989 to January, 2006, the period of our study. We also comment on the 9 Krueger and Kuttner (1996) show that funds rate forecast based on the futures prices are efficient: that is, the forecast errors are uncorrelated with other variables. Sack (2003) shows that these risk premia vary over time and that the impact of these variations on prices of futures with short horizons is limited and the impact increases with maturity. Since we are using daily data on the fed funds futures and sometimes intraday data, the premium for such a small time interval will be negligible. 10 When the event day is on the first days of month, we take the open and close prices of futures on the days to find the surprise change in rates. If the event day is on the last day of the month, we take the 1-month out futures prices on the last day of the previous month and the current-month prices on the first day of the month to find the surprise change in the fed funds target rate.
calculation of the surprise changes on the days that are at the beginning, at the end of months, or in some other unusual circumstances. We also report the statistical average and the standard deviation of the FFTR. By comparing two time periods, it is clear that the surprise change in the FFTR is less volatile in post-1994 period than pre-1994 (when policy actions were less transparent and not generally made in the FOMC meeting). We also study the 86 days on which there were no changes in FFTR. In 46 of those days the market was expecting an action by the Fed, so no change was considered an unexpected change that triggered a reaction by the stock market.
The market reaction around the Fed decisions
Finally, in order to study any deviations from EMH's expected "unpredictable" market reaction to the changes in the monetary policy, we follow the standard event-study approach. Our event-days are the days on which the decisions were made on FFTR.
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We test whether abnormal returns immediately before and after the event-days are zero, for example. We compute then abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns to see if the prices adjust to the announcements quickly and appropriately. If prices adjust to new information in efficient ways, there should not exist any predictable ways to trade for profit in the market. As noted before, in our study we use the broad market index, the CRSP Value-Weighted Index. 12 Under the no-predictability or efficient markets 11 There are some exceptions: in some days the decision of the rate change was announced after the market close. In those cases we will consider the next business day as the event day to capture the market reaction to announcements and subsequent behavior. We used the notes provided to us by Ken Kuttner, our investigation and Kuttner (2001) to resolve the timing issues of some of pre-1994 days, in which the news on the policy was out after the close of the futures market. 12 We also studied the reaction of the CRSP Equally-weighted index and found similar results.
hypothesis (EMH), there is no predictable way of earning statistically significant returns. Tables 2, 3 and 4 describe the data and the changes in the FFTR and give descriptive statistics. 14 . We were interested in determining whether that practice had any impact on the reaction of the market on the monetary policy. We find statistically significant, abnormal returns on the event-days during 1989-1994 and 1994-2005 . The abnormal return on the day of the events before 1994 is less than the one after 1994. We posit that the reason for this difference could be the reporting manner before and after 1994. The information conveyed by the Fed seems to have taken longer to be reflected in prices before 1994, as compared to the period after 1994. This may also explain why the abnormal return on the days after the event continues for a few days after the pre-1994 event (see Panel A of Table 3 ). Thus, the abnormal return on the event-days can be attributed to the market's reaction to the changes in monetary policy.
We also detect 15 basis points abnormal return to the CRSP WV index on days in which there were no changes in the monetary policy (perhaps, in some instances at least, the market was expecting a change). On days during which there was a negative surprise related to the change in FFTR, the abnormal return was 46 basis points. On days during which change in the FFTR was negative (a result of policy tightening), the abnormal return was 44 basis points regardless of the market expectations. Recall that Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) argued that a hypothetical 25-bps cut in the FFTR would be associated with a 100 bps increase in stock indices. Here, we find that the average abnormal return on the days of changes in FFTR is about 20 bps, a finding that could be entirely attributable to the changes in monetary policy. However, it turns out that in addition to the abnormal returns on the days of the events, there are abnormal returns on the days after the events. We find statistically significant positive abnormal returns (about 20 bps) on the next day following the event-day itself.
Our findings are set forth in Panel A of Table 3 and show that there is a positive and statistically significant abnormal return on the day after the event-day. We then refine and study the problem for any asymmetries in order to determine whether the findings depend on the direction of the monetary policy, the unexpected changes in the monetary policy, or the days of the FOMC meetings. Panel A of Table 3 shows further that the returns on the day after the event-days are positive and statistically significant for the periods 1989-1994 and the entire period of 1989 to 2005. That is, on the day following the event-day, the market continues to adjust to the new information conveyed by the Fed on the eventday.
To study the abnormal returns on the day after the event even further, we break all the event days into two additional groupings, whether the changes in FFTR was on those days when the FOMC met or on some other day. Our study determined that there is a 15 basis points abnormal return to the CRSP Value Weighted Index when FFTR changes are announced during the FOMC meetings. However, there was no abnormal return on the days when there were positive surprises in the changes in the federal funds rate. Also, there was no abnormal return a day after the days in which there was unexpected positive change in the FFTR.
We find abnormal returns on the days when there was negative surprise change in the FFTR. We also find a 32 basis point abnormal return to the CRSP VW index on the day after the days when there was a negative surprise in the change in FFTR. That is, if the actual changes in the FFTR were less than the anticipated ones, the market's reaction is positive and, in addition to that, this market reaction continues on the next day following the event.
We also find a 27 bps abnormal return to the index on days during which the change in the FFTR was negative, even if the change was expected. That is, the market underreacts to the Fed monetary policy tightening. Or, the information diffuses in the asset prices gradually when the Fed tightens monetary policy.
We also study the abnormal returns several days before and after the event days. Figures   1 to 5 show (for different cases) the cumulative abnormal returns days before and after the event-days. We can observe abnormal returns on the first day after the event. On other days there is no clearly significant abnormal return to the CRSP VW Index. One observation is particularly important: Figure 2 shows the cumulative abnormal returns for the period 1989 to 1994. As discussed above, prior to 1994 the information about FFTR change is incorporated into securities prices slowly because the Fed ordinarily refused to comment about its monetary policy decisions during the pre-1994 period. Thus, it would take longer for the market to reflect the new information regarding Fed monetary policy in securities' prices.
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Conclusion
We study the stock market's reaction to the Fed's monetary policy actions on the days after the policy announcements. We find statistically significant abnormal returns to the broad market index (CRSP VW Index) on the day following the day during which FOMC decisions were announced regarding its monetary policy and FFTR. The CRSP VW Index yields abnormal, positive returns on the day after the event-days (the day the FOMC announces its FFTR). This finding is robust. We find abnormal returns on the days of the events, which are attributed to the market's reaction to the changes in Fed monetary policy. However, we also detect positive abnormal return on the day after the event-day itself. If we assume that the stock market immediately incorporates all the available information in prices, then the phenomenon we find here could be labeled as an
anomaly. This cannot be classified as market over-reaction or under-reaction, in general.
We do not intend to use this as an argument against the EMH hypothesis or as a support for under-or over-reaction in the market. It may be a combination of both of these factors. There seems to be a convergence to efficiency that may be happening slowly, as a collective action of the market participants (as our Figures 1-5 would suggest) . Maybe the uncertainty of the impact of the monetary policy on securities' prices can be explained by the time it takes for prices to adjust. We did not address the question here as to the speed at which the prices adjust to the new information conveyed by the monetary policy actions. 16 We intend to study this in the near future. 15 We also study the days that we call reversals: the days on which the monetary policy is reversed -a long sequence of rate hikes in followed by a rate cut or the other way around and did not find abnormal returns on those days. 16 Chordia et al. (2002) study the speed at which the market converges to efficiency. Similar methods could be used to study the speed of convergence in this particular event. 
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Figure 1
The following figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns of the CRSP VW index on the days before and after the event. Day-0 is the day of the event. All the numbers are in basis points . This table is 
Figure 2
The following figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns of the CRSP VW index on the days before and after the event. Day-0 is the day of the event. All the numbers are in basis points. This table is for the time period from 1989 to 1994. 
Figure 3
The following figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns of the CRSP VW index on the days before and after the event. Day-0 is the day of the event. All the numbers are in basis points. This table is for the time period from 1989 to 2005 and the cases in which the unexpected change in the FFTR was negative. 
1989-2005
Figure 4
The following figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns of the CRSP VW index on the days before and after the event. Day-0 is the day of the event. All the numbers are in basis points. This table is for the time period from 1994 to 2005 and the cases in which the unexpected change in the FFTR was negative. 
1994-2005
Figure 5
The following figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns of the CRSP VW index on the days before and after the event. Day-0 is the day of the event. All the numbers are in basis points. This table is for the time period from 1989 to 2005 and the cases in which the change in the FFTR was negative. 
1989-2005
